

The Epistemological Skyhook Determinism Naturalism And Self Defeat Routledge Studies In Contemporary Philosophy

Logik ist nach dem traditionellen Verständnis eine ars iudicandi, eine Kunst, die Gültigkeit von Schlüssen zu prüfen. Da mit die normalen Mittel der modernen Logik zu diesem Zweck eingesetzt werden können, müssen erst Formeln an die Stelle von Sätzen treten: umgangssprachliche Schlüsse müssen adäquat formalisiert werden. Die richtige Formel entwickelt ein theoretisches Konzept des Formalisierens und praktisch anwendbare Adäquatheitskriterien für Formalisierungen. Dabei werden zentrale Fragen der Philosophie der Logik unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Zusammenspiels von Umgangssprache und Formalismus untersucht. Die ausführliche und systematische Diskussion von Formalisierungstests bietet eine wichtige Ergänzung zu den traditionellen Logiklehrbüchern.

Contemporary discussions in metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind are dominated by the presupposition of naturalism. Arguing against this established convention, Jim Slagle offers a thorough defence of Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (EAAN) and in doing so, reveals how it shows that evolution and naturalism are incompatible. Charting the development of Plantinga's argument, Slagle asserts that the probability of our cognitive faculties reliably producing true beliefs is low if ontological naturalism is true, and therefore all other beliefs produced by these faculties, including naturalism itself, are self-defeating. He critiques other well-known epistemological approaches, including those of Descartes and Quine, and deftly counters the many objections against the EAAN to conclude that metaphysical naturalism should be rejected on the grounds of self-defeat. By situating Plantinga's argument within a wider context and showing that science and evolution cannot entail naturalism, Slagle renders this most common metaphysical view irrational. As such, the book advocates an important reconsideration of contemporary thought at the intersection of philosophy, science and religion. Dieser Buchtitel ist Teil des Digitalisierungsprojekts Springer Book Archives mit Publikationen, die seit den Anfängen des Verlags von 1842 erschienen sind. Der Verlag stellt mit diesem Archiv Quellen für die historische wie auch die disziplingeschichtliche Forschung zur Verfügung, die jeweils im historischen Kontext betrachtet werden müssen. Dieser Titel erschien in der Zeit vor 1945 und wird daher in seiner zeittypischen politisch-ideologischen Ausrichtung vom Verlag nicht beworben.

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This collection offers a synoptic view of current philosophical debates concerning the relationship between facts and values, bringing together a wide spectrum of contributors committed to testing the validity of this dichotomy, exploring alternatives, and assessing their implications. The assumption that facts and values inhabit distinct, unbridgeable conceptual and experiential domains has long dominated scientific and philosophical discourse, but this separation has been seriously called into question from a number of corners. The original essays here collected offer a diversity of responses to fact-value dichotomy, including contributions from Hilary Putnam and Ruth Anna Putnam who are rightly credited with revitalizing philosophical interest in this alleged opposition. Both they, and many of our contributors, are in agreement that the relationship between epistemic developments and evaluative attitudes cannot be framed as a conflict between descriptive and normative understanding. Each chapter demonstrates how and why contrapositions between science and ethics, between facts and values, and between objective and subjective are false dichotomies. Values cannot simply be separated from reason. Facts and Values will therefore prove essential reading for analytic and continental philosophers alike, for theorists of ethics and meta-ethics, and for philosophers of economics and law.

Throughout philosophical history, there has been a recurring argument to the effect that determinism, naturalism, or both are self-referentially incoherent. By accepting determinism or naturalism, one allegedly acquires a reason to reject determinism or naturalism. The Epistemological Skyhook brings together, for the first time, the principal expressions of this argument, focusing primarily on the last 150 years. This book addresses the versions of this argument as presented by Arthur Lovejoy, A.E. Taylor, Kurt Gödel, C.S. Lewis, Norman Malcolm, Karl Popper, J.R. Lucas, William Hasker, Thomas Nagel, Alvin Plantinga, and others, along with the objections presented by their many detractors. It concludes by presenting a new version of the argument that synthesizes the best aspects of the others while also rendering the argument immune to some of the most significant objections made to it.

This volume attempts to solve a grave problem about critical self-reflection. The worry is that we critical thinkers are all in "epistemic bad faith" in light of what psychology tells us. After all, the research shows not merely that we are bad at detecting "ego-threatening" thoughts à la Freud. It also indicates that we are ignorant of even our ordinary thoughts—e.g., reasons for our moral judgments of others (Haidt 2001), and even mundane reasons for buying one pair of stockings over another! (Nisbett & Wilson 1977) However, reflection on one's thoughts requires knowing what those thoughts are in the first place. So if ignorance is the norm, why attempt self-reflection? The activity would just display naivety about psychology. Yet while respecting all the data, this book argues that, remarkably, we are sometimes infallible in our self-discerning judgments. Even so, infallibility does not imply indubitability, and there is no Cartesian ambition to provide a "foundation" for empirical knowledge. The point is rather to explain how self-reflection as a rational activity is possible.

Downward causation plays a fundamental role in many theories of metaphysics and philosophy of mind. It is strictly connected with many topics in philosophy, including but not limited to: emergence, mental causation, the nature of causation, the nature of causal powers and dispositions, laws of nature, and the possibility of ontological and epistemic reductions. Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation brings together experts from different fields—including William Bechtel, Stewart Clark and Tom

Lancaster, Carl Gillett, John Heil, Robin F. Hendry, Max Kistler, Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum —who delve into classic and unexplored lines of philosophical inquiry related to downward causation. It critically assesses the possibility of downward causation given different ontological assumptions and explores the connection between downward causation and the metaphysics of causation and dispositions. Finally, it presents different cases of downward causation in empirical fields such as physics, chemistry, biology and the neurosciences. This volume is both a useful introduction and a collection of original contributions on this fascinating and hotly debated philosophical topic.

Nachdruck des Originals von 1922.

In *Learning from Our Mistakes: Epistemology for the Real World*, William J. Talbott provides a new framework for understanding the history of Western epistemology and uses it to propose a new way of understanding rational belief that can be applied to pressing social and political issues. Talbott's new model of rational belief is not a model of a theorem prover in mathematics. It is a model of a good learner. Being a good learner requires sensitivity to clues, the imaginative ability to generate alternative explanatory narratives that fit the clues, and the ability to select the most coherent explanatory narrative. Sensitivity to clues requires sensitivity not only to evidence that supports one's own beliefs, but also to evidence that casts doubt on them. One of the most important characteristics of a good learner is the ability to correct mistakes. From this model, Talbott articulates nine principles that help to explain the difference between rational and irrational belief. Talbott contrasts his approach with the approach of historically important philosophers, including Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein, and Kuhn, as well as with a range of contemporary approaches, including pragmatism, Bayesianism, and naturalism. On the basis of his model of rational belief, Talbott articulates a new theory of prejudice, which he uses to help diagnose the sources of inequity in the U.S. criminal justice system, as well as to provide insight into the proliferation of tribal and fascist epistemologies based on alt-facts and alt-truth. *Learning from Our Mistakes* offers a new lens through which to interpret the history of Western epistemology and analyze the complicated social and political phenomena facing us today.

This book brings together new essays that explore the connection between love and reasons. The observation that considerations of love carry significant weight in the deliberative process opens up new perspectives in the classic discussion about practical reasons, and gives rise to many interesting questions about the nature of love's reasons, about their source and legitimacy, about their relation to moral and epistemic reasons, and about the extent to which love is sensitive to reasons. The contributors to this volume orient questions related to love within the broader context of the contemporary discussion on practical reasons, and move forward the conversation about the normative dimensions of love. *Love, Reason and Morality* will be of interest to philosophers working on issues of normativity, meta-ethics and moral psychology, and especially those interested in the source of practical reasons and the role of attachments in practical deliberation.

This edited collection focuses on the moral and social dimensions of ignorance—an undertheorized category in analytic philosophy. Contributors address such issues as the relation between ignorance and deception, ignorance as a moral excuse, ignorance as a legal excuse, and the relation between ignorance and moral character. In the moral realm, ignorance is sometimes considered as an excuse; some specific kind of ignorance seems to be implied by a moral character; and ignorance is closely related to moral risk. Ignorance has certain social dimensions as well: it has been claimed to be the engine of science; it seems to be entailed by privacy and secrecy; and it is widely thought to constitute a legal excuse in certain circumstances. Together, these contributions provide a sustained inquiry into the nature of ignorance and the pivotal role it plays in the moral and social domains.

Die fünf Bände enthalten die Hauptvorträge und eingeladene Beiträge der panels des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, der 2005 in Sao Paolo stattfand.

The notion of disinterestedness is often conceived of as antiquated or ideological. In spite of this, Hilgers argues that one cannot reject it if one wishes to understand the nature of art. He claims that an artwork typically asks a person to adopt a disinterested attitude towards what it shows, and that the effect of such an adoption is that it makes the person temporarily lose the sense of herself, while enabling her to gain a sense of the other. Due to an artwork's particular wealth, multiperspectivity, and dialecticity, the engagement with it cannot culminate in the construction of world-views, but must initiate a process of self-critical thinking, which is a precondition of real self-determination. Ultimately, then, the aesthetic experience of art consists of a dynamic process of losing the sense of oneself, while gaining a sense of the other, and of achieving selfhood. In his book, Hilgers spells out the nature of this process by means of rethinking Kant's and Schopenhauer's aesthetic theories in light of more recent developments in philosophy—specifically in hermeneutics, critical theory, and analytic philosophy—and within the arts themselves—specifically within film and performance art.

Wie bereits in früheren Büchern (BA 12/87, 12/94, 12/96) befaßt sich der Autor mit Themen der Evolution auf der Grundlage der von Darwin entwickelten Erkenntnisse. Dawkins veranschaulicht die weitgehend rätselhaft dynamische Entwicklung des Lebens im Wechselspiel von Mutation und Selektion, von egoistischem Eigeninteresse und altruistischer Selbstbeschränkung der Organismen, - eine Dynamik, die sich häufig rationalistischer Logik entzieht, weil die großen Zeitdimensionen menschliches Vorstellungsvermögen übersteigt. An Hand detaillierter Fakten belegt er, daß äußerst komplexe und raffinierte Evolutionsleistungen nicht das Ergebnis kalkulierter Planung und Berechnung sind, sondern daß sie wahrscheinlich ohne gestaltete Absicht zu stande kommen. Das Buch hat nicht mehr die aktuelle Brisanz seines weithin bekannten und aufsehenerregenden Titels "Das egoistische Gen" (BA 12/94), es überzeugt aber wieder auf Grund seiner biologisch fundierten, schlüssigen Argumentationsweise und seiner methaphernreichen, stilistisch effektvollen Darstellung. - Für viele Bibliotheken. (2)

Does atheism have a monopoly on reason and science? Many think so--or simply assume so. *Atheism?* challenges the many hidden assumptions that have led to the popular

belief that atheism is the "default" position for explaining reality. Delving into the most basic and fundamental questions of existence, this thought-provoking book explains that atheism does not and cannot provide a secure foundation for thought and life. Specifically, it demonstrates that atheistic theories cannot explain the existence of an ordered universe, the conundrums of consciousness and knowledge, or why there is morality or beauty. Rather than being the result of reason, atheism is shown to be, in effect, a revolt against reason. If you enjoy pondering the most basic issues that confront us in our world today, then *Atheism?* is the book for you.

Although scholarship in philosophy of action has grown in recent years, there has been little work explicitly dealing with the role of time in agency, a role with great significance for the study of action. As the articles in this collection demonstrate, virtually every fundamental issue in the philosophy of action involves considerations of time. The four sections of this volume address the metaphysics of action, diachronic practical rationality, the relation between deliberation and action, and the phenomenology of agency, providing an overview of the central developments in each area with an emphasis on the role of temporality. Including contributions by established, rising, and new voices in the field, *Time and the Philosophy of Action* brings analytic work in philosophy of action together with contributions from continental philosophy and cognitive science to elaborate the central thesis that agency not only develops in time but is shaped by it at every level.

McTaggart's argument for the unreality of time, first published in 1908, set the agenda for 20th-century philosophy of time. Yet there is very little agreement on what it actually says—nobody agrees with the conclusion, but still everybody finds something important in it. This book presents the first critical overview of the last century of debate on what is popularly called "McTaggart's Paradox". Scholars have long assumed that McTaggart's argument stands alone and does not rely on any contentious ontological principles. The author demonstrates that these assumptions are incorrect—McTaggart himself explicitly claimed his argument to be dependent on the ontological principles that form the basis of his idealist metaphysics. The result is that scholars have proceeded to understand the argument on the basis of their own metaphysical assumptions, duly arriving at very different interpretations. This book offers an alternative reading of McTaggart's argument, and at the same time explains why other commentators arrive at their mutually incompatible interpretations. It will be of interest to students and scholars with an interest in the philosophy of time and other areas of contemporary metaphysics.

This book reconceives virtue epistemology in light of the conviction that we are essentially social creatures. Virtue is normally thought of as something that allows individuals to accomplish things on their own. Although contemporary ethics is increasingly making room for an inherently social dimension in moral agency, intellectual virtues continue to be seen in terms of the computing potential of a brain taken by itself. Thinking in these terms, however, seriously misconstrues the way in which our individual flourishing hinges on our collective flourishing. Green's account of virtue epistemology is based on the extended credit view, which conceives of knowledge as an achievement and broadens that focus to include team achievements in addition to individual ones. He argues that this view does a better job than alternatives of answering the many conceptual and empirical challenges for virtue epistemology that have been based on cases of testimony. The view also allows for a nuanced interaction with situationist psychology, dual processing models in cognitive science, and the extended mind literature in philosophy of mind. This framework provides a useful conceptual bridge between individual and group epistemology, and it has novel applications to the epistemology of disagreement, prejudice, and authority.

Dieses Buch enthält den ergreifenden Bericht der Autorin über die letzten zehn Lebensjahre Jean-Paul Sartres und die Gespräche, die sie im Sommer und Herbst 1974 in Rom und Paris mit ihm führte – über sein Leben und Werk, über Herkunft und Einflüsse, Liebe und Freundschaft, Freiheit und Glück, über den Tod. «Das in jeder Hinsicht ungewöhnliche und meisterhafte Buch ist die souveränste Arbeit, die Sartre nach seinem Tod gewidmet wurde.» (Wilfried Wiegand, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung)

Was ist der menschliche Geist und wie ist er überhaupt möglich? Daniel Dennett ist der weltweit wohl bedeutendste Fürsprecher von Materialismus, Aufklärung und Wissenschaft. Seit über fünfzig Jahren wirbt und streitet er für seine Ansichten. Mit diesem Buch wagt er noch einmal einen Rundumschlag, eine Meistererzählung von den Ursprüngen des Lebens über die Geistesgrößen der Menschheit wie Johann Sebastian Bach, Marie Curie oder Pablo Picasso bis hin zur künstlichen Intelligenz. Dennett zeigt, wie eine vollkommen geistlose genetische und kulturelle Evolution es geschafft hat, zunächst die Einzeller, dann Pflanzen und Tiere sowie schließlich den Geist, die Kultur und das Bewusstsein hervorzubringen. Und er schießt dabei gewohnt scharf gegen Kreationisten, Antidarwinisten und alle anderen, denen ihr dogmatischer Schlummer wichtiger ist als die Wahrheit.

Hans-Jürgen Puhle hat seit langem als Historiker und Politikwissenschaftler vor allem zwei große Themenkomplexe im Vergleich bearbeitet: die unterschiedlichen Entwicklungswege einzelner Gesellschaften und Staaten in die Moderne seit dem ausgehenden 18. Jahrhundert, und Entwicklung und Wandel organisierter Politik und politischer Öffentlichkeit in den Prozessen der Durchsetzung von Interventionsstaatlichkeit und Massendemokratie, insbesondere zwischen dem qualitativen ›Sprung‹ der Modernisierung und Ausweitung politischer Organisation am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts und einer ähnlich einschneidenden Zäsur hundert Jahre später im Zeichen von Informationstechnologie, vermehrter Fragmentierung und transnationaler und globaler Vernetzung und Entgrenzung. Die in diesem Band versammelten Aufsätze aus vier Jahrzehnten über gesellschaftliche und politische Entwicklungen in Deutschland, West- und Südeuropa, Nordamerika und Lateinamerika beleuchten exemplarisch u.a. Entwicklung und Wandel politischer Akteure (Protestbewegungen, Parteien, Verbände), Prozesse und Systeme, Probleme von Regimewechsel, Demokratisierung und Demokratiedefekten, die Stufen entwicklungs- und reformpolitischer Strategien, Mechanismen von Nationalismus und Populismus, Transformationstendenzen repräsentativer Demokratien sowie zentrale Charakteristika der unterschiedlichen Entwicklungswege der behandelten Gesellschaften.

This book offers a comprehensive account of logic that addresses fundamental issues concerning the nature and foundations of the discipline. The authors claim that these foundations can not only be established without the need for strong metaphysical assumptions, but also without hypostasizing logical forms as specific entities. They present a systematic argument that the primary subject matter of logic is our linguistic interaction rather than our private reasoning and it is thus misleading to see logic as revealing "the laws of thought". In this sense, fundamental

logical laws are implicit to our "language games" and are thus more similar to social norms than to the laws of nature. Peregrin and Svoboda also show that logical theories, despite the fact that they rely on rules implicit to our actual linguistic practice, firm up these rules and make them explicit. By carefully scrutinizing the project of logical analysis, the authors demonstrate that logical rules can be best seen as products of the so called reflective equilibrium. They suggest that we can profit from viewing languages as "inferential landscapes" and logicians as "geographers" who map them and try to pave safe routes through them. This book is an essential resource for scholars and researchers engaged with the foundations of logical theories and the philosophy of language.

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