

## Neville Chamberlain And Appeasement

Studienarbeit aus dem Jahr 2007 im Fachbereich Geschichte Europa - Deutschland - Nationalsozialismus, II. Weltkrieg, Note: 2,3, Technische Universität Dresden (Institut für Geschichte), Veranstaltung: Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik, Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: "Sie haben den Entschluß gefasst, unentschlossen zu sein; sie sind willens, keinen Willen zu haben; mit eiserner Energie lassen sie die Zügel schleifen, allmächtig in ihrer Ohnmacht." Dieses Zitat Winston Churchills setzt ohne Zweifel nur eine Seite unserer Eingangs gestellten Forschungsfrage in den Vordergrund, nämlich jene der unfähigen Politiker und stellt damit eine einseitige Betrachtung dar, welche in diesem einleitenden Rahmen natürlich gewünscht ist und das eine Extrem der verschiedenen Meinungen zu diesem Thema kontrastiert. Unentschlossenheit, Willenlosigkeit und Ohnmacht sind die Grundfeste Churchills Kritik, welche von ihm noch vor dem Münchener Abkommen bzw. noch vor der Zerschlagung der "Rest-Tschechei" gegen die vorrangig von Neville Chamberlain betriebene Appeasement-Politik Englands vorgebracht wurde. Ob diese Kritik gerechtfertigt ist oder vielmehr eine aus regierungsoptionellen Gesichtspunkten geäußerte Behauptung darstellt, soll immanant mit dieser Arbeit ebenso beantwortet werden, wie die Frage, ob es Alternativen zur Befriedungspolitik Chamberlains gab und wie diese hätten aussehen können. © Ralph Paschwitz

Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement, and the British Road to War Manchester University Press

Studienarbeit aus dem Jahr 2015 im Fachbereich Gemeinschaftskunde / Sozialkunde, Note: 1,7, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena (Institut für Politikwissenschaft), Veranstaltung: POL 120 - Allgemeine Schlüsselqualifikation I "Technik wissenschaftlichen Arbeitens," Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: Im Jahr 2015 jährte sich das Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges zum 70. Mal. Zahlreiche Untersuchungen, Forschungen sowie Analysen liefern stets neue Ergebnisse und Befunde über den Zweiten Weltkrieg. Von besonderer Bedeutung ist die Wegbereitung des Krieges. Die Wissenschaft versucht, die Ursachen eines Krieges zu analysieren und zu erschliessen. Viele Historiker sind sich einig, dass die Appeasement-Politik einer von vielen Indikatoren für die Wegbereitung des Krieges von 1939-1945 ist. Diese beschreibt oft die Position Neville Chamberlains, dem britischen Premierminister von 1937-1940, gegenüber dem Deutschen Reich."

This bold new interpretation of Anglo-German appeasement challenges existing accounts, both orthodox and revisionist, by focusing on the economic motivations behind appeasement rather than on the workings of foreign policy. Scott Newton argues that appeasement stemmed from the determination of interwar administrations, particularly that of Neville Chamberlain, to protect the liberal-capitalist status quo established in the collapse of Lloyd George's attempts at reconstruction after 1918. Newton shows that the Government, aided and abetted by the Bank of England, the City, and large-scale industry, maintained its search for detente well beyond the outbreak of war, up until Churchill became Prime Minister in May 1940. The author goes on to reveal that certain circles within the establishment loyal to the prewar order continued their efforts to reach agreement with Germany even after 1940. He argues that the Hess affair represented the appeasers' last throw: the subsequent entry of the

USSR and the USA into the conflict guaranteed the impossibility of a separate Anglo-German settlement, and combined with war socialism at home to open the door to a new era characterized by the welfare state and the Anglo-American special relationship. This is the first major study to provide a thorough analysis of the domestic political and economic background to appeasement, and to explain fully the reasons behind the persistence of the appeasement lobby even beyond the outbreak of war. "The book details the course of that historiographical debate, beginning with the earliest accounts on appeasement from 1938 through 1940."

On September 30, 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain flew back to London from his meeting in Munich with German Chancellor Adolf Hitler. As he disembarked from the aircraft, he held aloft a piece of paper, which contained the promise that Britain and Germany would never go to war with one another again. He had returned bringing "Peace with honour—Peace for our time." Drawing on a wealth of archival material, acclaimed historian David Faber delivers a sweeping reassessment of the extraordinary events of 1938, tracing the key incidents leading up to the Munich Conference and its immediate aftermath: Lord Halifax's ill-fated meeting with Hitler; Chamberlain's secret discussions with Mussolini; and the Berlin scandal that rocked Hitler's regime. He takes us to Vienna, to the Sudetenland, and to Prague. In Berlin, we witness Hitler inexorably preparing for war, even in the face of opposition from his own generals; in London, we watch as Chamberlain makes one supreme effort after another to appease Hitler. Resonating with an insider's feel for the political infighting Faber uncovers, Munich, 1938 transports us to the war rooms and bunkers, revealing the covert negotiations and scandals upon which the world's fate would rest. It is modern history writing at its best.

Challenges prevailing images of Neville Chamberlain as a man of peace, and suggests that Chamberlain dominated his government and manipulated those around him in support of his own vision of Britain's national interest.

Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasing Hitler's Germany has been widely condemned. However, historians (and politicians) have been divided about the viability of alternative courses of action. Andrew David Stedman's illuminating new study of British foreign policy before World War II systematically analyses the various alternatives to appeasement - from isolationism to collective security to outright war - and examines their origins, risks and feasibility. It surveys the advocates of other strategies - including key thinkers and decision-makers such as Churchill, Eden, Amery, Beaverbrook and Halifax - and outlines the complexities of the decisions they faced, which have previously been largely overlooked. Marking a valuable new contribution to appeasement historiography, this is the first work to synthesise all the alternatives available to Chamberlain, as well as illuminating policy debate within the British government. Stedman provides a vigorous analysis of Chamberlain's assessment of each rival policy, and shows why ultimately, he opted for appeasement. Also contributing to debates on the use of appeasement in the modern world, this book will be essential reading for historians of World War II and the twentieth century, as well as scholars of International Relations

In this controversial reevaluation of Neville Chamberlain and appeasement, the author argues that Chamberlain believed a Second World War would be disastrous for Britain, and focused all his energies to avoid it. The book sets Chamberlain's actions within a

wider chronological framework and takes a fresh look at the underlying influences on the policy of appeasement within British society. Distributed in the US by St. Martin's Press. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

"A new history of the British appeasement of the Third Reich on the eve of World War II"--

Studienarbeit aus dem Jahr 2006 im Fachbereich Geschichte Europa - Deutschland - Nationalsozialismus, II. Weltkrieg, Note: 1,5, Universität Leipzig (Historisches Seminar), Veranstaltung: Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik, Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: Das Thema dieser Arbeit lautet: Die englische Garantieerklärung vom 31. März 1939 im Kontext der Appeasement-Politik." Um diesen Gegenstand der Arbeit näher zu beleuchten, wird als erstes Appeasement als Begriff geklärt, um danach die englische und deutsche Aussenpolitik von 1933 bis 1937 bzw. 1937 bis 1939 zu betrachten. Dies erscheint der Verfasserin zum Verständnis und für die Einordnung der englischen Beistandserklärung an Polen als notwendig. Fraglich ist, ob die seitens der Regierung Chamberlain abgegebene Garantie an Polen das Ende der Appeasement-Politik bedeutet. Jene Frage gilt als die Hauptleitfrage dieser wissenschaftlichen Arbeit. Um sie beantworten zu können, werden der Weg zur Garantieerklärung, d.h. welche genauen Ereignisse und Zusammenhänge dazu führten, der Inhalt sowie die Ziele dieser erläutert. Im Anschluss daran betrachtet die Verfasserin direkte Folgen und Reaktionen auf den Beistandspakt aus den verschiedenen Perspektiven. Weiterhin wird der Frage im Sinne der Hauptleitfrage nachgegangen, ob die Garantie als Mittel der Appeasement-Politik anzusehen ist und es wird diesbezüglich eine Bewertung abgegeben. Im Folgenden schliesst sich eine Erläuterung der englischen Politik bis zum Kriegsausbruch an. Ein Fazit schliesst den Hauptteil der Arbeit ab. In der Zusammenfassung wird sodann dargelegt, welche Erkenntnisse die Verfasserin bzgl. der Frage nach der Bedeutung der Garantieerklärung an Polen im Kontext der Appeasement-Politik erschlossen

An in-depth look at the misguided foreign policy of appeasement towards Hitler and the Third Reich during World War II—from a world renowned historian. World War II and its attendant horrors arguably began in the British policy of appeasement of the Nazi rise to power between the First and Second World Wars. In this compelling work, Martin Gilbert walks the reader through several decades of behavior that, in retrospect, is hard to accept. Gilbert's incisive focus on primary sources uncovers the real reasons for the appeasement policy, from the search for a just peace to attempts to avoid another war at all costs—illuminating the historical underpinnings of a fatally flawed policy and its tragic consequences for the Jewish people. This book also contains a chronology of appeasement policy as well as five specially drawn maps and five appendices—including a transcript of British statesman and politician David Lloyd George's conversation with Hitler at Berchtesgaden in 1936.

History has not looked kindly upon Neville Chamberlain. Despite a long and distinguished political career, his trip to Munich in 1938 and the 'appeasement' of Hitler have forever overshadowed his many other achievements and blighted his reputation, his name now synonymous with the futility of trying to reason with dictators and bullies. Yet, as this biography shows, there is much more to this complex and intriguing character than is generally supposed, and even the infamous events of 1938 are open to more charitable interpretations than is

usually the case. Appeasement brought the British government crucial time in which to rearm, and in particular allowed the RAF to drastically increase the number of fighter aircraft it could muster for the Battle of Britain during the summer of 1940. Based on the study of over 150 collections of private papers on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as exhaustive exploration of British government records held in the National Archives, it is no exaggeration to say that the author has surveyed virtually all the existing archival material written by or to Chamberlain, as well as a high proportion of that referring to him. As such, this volume will no doubt establish itself as the definitive account of Chamberlain's life and career, and provide a much fuller and fairer picture of his actions than has hitherto been the case.

\*Includes pictures\*Explains the appeasement of the Nazis in Czechoslovakia and Austria, and reactions to it\*Includes online resources and a bibliography for further reading\*Includes a table of contents

"My good friends," the mustached, bony man with thick eyebrows and large, strong teeth somewhat reminiscent of those of a horse, shouted to the crowds from the second-floor window of his house at 10 Downing Street, "this is the second time in our history, that there has come back to Downing Street from Germany peace with honor. I believe it is peace for our time." (McDonough, 1998, 70). The man addressing the crowd, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, had just returned from the heart of Nazi Germany following negotiations with Adolf Hitler, and the crowd gathered outside the English leader's house on September 30, 1938 greeted these ringing words with grateful cheers. The piece of paper Chamberlain flourished exultantly seemed to offer permanent amity and goodwill between democratic Britain and totalitarian Germany. In it, Britain agreed to allow Hitler's Third Reich to absorb the Sudeten regions of Czechoslovakia without interference from either England or France, and since high percentages of ethnic Germans - often more than 50% locally - inhabited these regions, Hitler's demand for this territory seemed somewhat reasonable to Chamberlain and his supporters. With Germany resurgent and rearmed after the disasters inflicted on it by the Treaty of Versailles following World War I, the pact - known as the Munich Agreement - held out hope of a quick end to German ambitions and the return of stable, normal international relations across Europe. Of course, the Munich agreement is now notorious because its promise proved barren within a very short period of time. Chamberlain's actions either failed to avert or actually hastened the very cataclysm he wished to avoid at all costs. The "Munich Agreement" of 1938 effectively signed away Czechoslovakia's independence to Hitler's hungry new Third Reich, and within two years, most of the world found itself plunged into a conflict which made a charnelhouse of Europe and left somewhere between 60-80 million people dead globally. Many people hailed Chamberlain's "success" at defusing Nazi aggression by handing over Czechoslovakia tamely to Hitler's control, but others remained dubious. douard Daladier, the French prime minister, "later told Amery that he turned up his coat collar to protect his face

from rotten eggs when he arrived in Paris." (Gilbert, 1963, 179-180). A Foreign Office man, Orme Sargent, was disgusted, and he later said bitterly, "For all the fun and cheers, you might think they were celebrating a major victory over an enemy instead of merely the betrayal of a minor ally." (Gilbert, 1963, 180). Winston Churchill, the deal's most famous critic, bitterly remarked, "England has been offered a choice between war and shame. She has chosen shame, and will get war." Munich is widely reviled today and is held up as the epitome of appeasement, but historians still debate its effects on the Second World War, as well as Neville Chamberlain's character and motivations. Some believe the attempted appeasement of Nazi Germany hastened, or even caused, the mayhem occupying the next seven years. Others believe that the pact merely failed to alter war's inevitable arrival in either direction. Historians and authors alternately interpret Chamberlain as a bumbling, arrogant fool, a strong-willed statesman who simply miscalculated the nature of Hitler and Nazi Germany, or even a man with dictatorial ambitions surreptitiously inserting himself into the Fuhrer's orbit and prevented from further damaging democracy only by his fall and death from bowel cancer. Another possible interpretation, with considerable documentary support, asserts Chamberlain wished to enlist Germany's aid against the state most Europeans perceived as the true threat of the era, the Soviet Union.

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time. Chamberlain's actions either failed to avert or actually hastened the very cataclysm he wished to avoid at all costs. The "Munich Agreement" of 1938 effectively signed away Czechoslovakia's independence to Hitler's hungry new Third Reich, and within two years, most of the world found itself plunged into a conflict which made a charnelhouse of Europe and left somewhere between 60-80 million people dead globally. Many people hailed Chamberlain's "success" at defusing Nazi aggression by handing over Czechoslovakia tamely to Hitler's control, but others remained dubious. Edouard Daladier, the French prime minister, "later told Amery that he turned up his coat collar to protect his face from rotten eggs when he arrived in Paris." (Gilbert, 1963, 179-180). A Foreign Office man, Orme Sargent, was disgusted, and he later said bitterly, "For all the fun and cheers, you might think they were celebrating a major victory over an enemy instead of merely the betrayal of a minor ally." (Gilbert, 1963, 180). Winston Churchill, the deal's most famous critic, bitterly remarked, "England has been offered a choice between war and shame. She has chosen shame, and will get war." Munich is widely reviled today and is held up as the epitome of appeasement, but historians still debate its effects on the Second World War, as well as Neville Chamberlain's character and motivations. Some believe the attempted appeasement of Nazi Germany hastened, or even caused, the mayhem occupying the next seven years. Others believe that the pact merely failed to alter war's inevitable arrival in either direction. Historians and authors alternately interpret Chamberlain as a bumbling, arrogant fool, a strong-willed statesman who simply miscalculated the nature of Hitler and Nazi Germany, or even a man with dictatorial ambitions surreptitiously inserting himself into the Fuhrer's orbit and prevented from further damaging democracy only by his fall and death from bowel cancer. Another possible interpretation, with considerable documentary support, asserts Chamberlain wished to enlist Germany's aid against the state most Europeans perceived as the true threat of the era, the Soviet Union."

Neville Chamberlain is usually remembered today as a weak man feebly clutching an umbrella, trying to satisfy Hitler's voracious appetite so England will be let alone. World War II made appeasement, and its crowning diplomatic event, the 1938 Munich conference, synonyms for sacrificing the interests of others in futile attempts to placate dictators. This view of appeasement and of Munich influenced several generations of American Cold War diplomats and strategists, and is still frequently employed today to flay policies deemed weak in the face of bullying dictators. While Vietnam goes far to offset Munich as a foreign policy metaphor in the minds of today's statesmen, the image of appeasement has persisted strongly enough for the U.S. Institute of Peace to conduct a conference on Munich's modern relevance in 1988, even as the Cold War was beginning to come to an end. But contrary to the harsh Cold War image of Neville Chamberlain as a political naif and weakling, in reality he was a remarkably strong political personality, who consciously pursued a long-term settlement of

post-Great War issues through a calculated strategy that had Britain's economic security at its heart. For him, appeasement was "not the diplomacy of capitulation, but a dramatically positive effort to achieve a settlement of the issues that had plagued European politics since 1919"--Akin to gentlemanly agreements in the Victorian era to redraw the political map of Europe. Far from being a portrait of foreign policy weakness, the study of Neville Chamberlain suggests that resolution and clearly related ends and means are dangerous substitutes for foreign affairs knowledge and judgment. And it may serve as a reminder also that an economics-oriented national security policy depreciates the importance of political and military power at its peril, perhaps even in the post-Cold War era.

A radically new view of the British policy of appeasement in the late 1930s, identifying the individuals responsible for a variety of miscalculations and moral surrender that made World War II inevitable. Appeasement failed in all its goals. The kindest thing that can be said of it is that postponed World War II by one year. Its real effect was to convince Hitler and Mussolini that Britain was weak and afraid of confrontation, encouraging them to ever-greater acts of aggression. Chamberlain and Wilson blindly pursued bilateral friendship between Britain and the dictators and ferociously resisted alternative policies such as working with France, the Soviet Union, or the U.S. to face down the dictators. They resisted all-out rearmament which would have put the economy on a war footing. These were all the policies advocated by Winston Churchill, the most dangerous opponent of appeasement. Neither Chamberlain nor Wilson had any experience of day-to-day practical diplomacy. Both thought that the dictators would apply the same standards of rationality and clarity to the policies of Italy and Germany that applied in Britain. They could not grasp that Fascist demagogues operated in an entirely different way to democratic politicians. The catastrophe of the Chamberlain/Wilson appeasement policy offers a vital lesson in how blind conviction in one policy as the only alternative can be fatally damaging. Neville Chamberlain, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom until 1940, is identified with the policy of 'appeasement' towards Adolf Hitler's Germany in the period preceding World War II. In this new study Dr Andrew Elsbey assesses the different explanations of appeasement.

Based largely on Neville Chamberlain's own words and official government documents, this book describes how were it not for Chamberlain's powerful, dominating presence in the British government, World War II might have been avoided. • Describes how Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement with Germany brought England unprepared to the brink of conflict—a historic lesson that has value and relevance today for those studying relationships in the Middle East • Addresses why Chamberlain took chances with British national security, how he sabotaged talks with the Russians, and how he misled his colleagues down the path of appeasement • Draws information from primary sources such as Chamberlain's diary, his faithful exchange of weekly letters with his sisters, and the weekly Cabinet minutes to provide a more complete understanding of events

Am Wochenende des 21./22. Mai 1938 spitzte sich die seit dem „Anschluss“ Österreichs schwelende Sudetenkrise plötzlich zu und führte Europa bis an den Rand des Krieges. Gerüchte über deutsche Angriffsabsichten deuteten auf einen neuerlichen Überraschungscoup Hitlers hin. Die tschechoslowakische Regierung verfügte eine Teilmobilmachung ihrer Streitkräfte, und 48 Stunden lang beherrschte Kriegspanik die Szenerie. Eine formelle Warnung Londons an die Reichsregierung hatte dabei die Außenwirkung eines britischen Ultimatums an die Adresse Hitlers. Die befürchtete deutsche Aktion blieb aber aus. Die Lage entspannte sich so plötzlich, wie die Krise begonnen hatte. Als „Wochenendkrise“ bzw. „Maikrise“ gingen diese turbulenten Tage in die Geschichtsbücher ein. Viele Zusammenhänge des Krisenwochenendes sind allerdings nach wie vor unklar. Vor allem die mysteriösen Hintergründe trugen dazu bei, dass die „Wochenendkrise“ eines der letzten großen Rätsel der Vorgeschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges blieb.

A biography reassessing the man whose name became a synonym for appeasement: “An important read for anyone with an interest in the prelude to World War II.” —The NYMAS Review Neville Chamberlain has gone down in history as the architect of appeasement, the prime minister who by sacrificing Czechoslovakia at Munich in September 1938 put Britain on an inevitable path to war. In this radical new appraisal of one of the most vilified politicians of the twentieth century, historian Nicholas Milton claims that by placating Hitler, Chamberlain not only reflected public opinion but also embraced the zeitgeist of the time. Chamberlain also bought Britain vital time to rearm when Hitler’s military machine was at its zenith. It is with the hindsight of history that we understand Chamberlain’s failure to ultimately prevent a war from happening. Yet by placing him within the context of his time, this fascinating new history provides a unique perspective into the lives and mindset of the people of Britain during the lead up to the Second World War. Never before have Chamberlain’s letters been accessed to tell the story of his life and work. They shed new light on his complex character and enable us to consider Chamberlain the man, not just the statesman. His role as a pioneer of conservation is revealed, alongside his work in improving midwifery and championing the introduction of widows’ pensions. Neville Chamberlain’s Legacy is a reminder that there is often more to political figures than many a quick judgment allows. September 1938 – in München treffen sich Hitler, Chamberlain, Mussolini und Daladier zu einer kurzfristig einberufenen Konferenz. Der Weltfrieden hängt am seidenen Faden. Im Gefolge des britischen Premierministers Chamberlain befindet sich Hugh Legat aus dem Außenministerium, der ihm als Privatsekretär zugeordnet ist. Auf der deutschen Seite gehört Paul von Hartmann aus dem Auswärtigen Amt in Berlin zum Kreis der Anwesenden. Den Zugang zur Delegation hat er sich erschlichen. Insgeheim ist er Mitglied einer Widerstandszelle gegen Hitler. Legat und von Hartmann verbindet eine Freundschaft, seit sie in Oxford gemeinsam studiert haben. Nun kreuzen sich ihre Wege wieder. Wie weit müssen sie gehen, wenn sie den drohenden Krieg verhindern wollen? Der neue Politthriller von Robert Harris – ein Roman über Hochverrat und Unbestechlichkeit, über Loyalität und Vertrauensbruch. Und wie immer bei Robert Harris lassen sich über die historischen Figuren und Ereignisse erhellende Bezüge zur aktuellen Weltpolitik herstellen.

Most studies of World War II assume that it was, in some way, a triumph for Britain. John Charmley's important new reappraisal of the immediate origins of the war is based



on extensive new work in the Chamberlain papers. It starts from Chamberlain's belief that even a victorious war would be a disaster—it would destroy the foundations of British power and hand over Europe to Russian domination. Reconstructing Chamberlain's policy assumptions, Mr. Charmley argues that they were neither naïve nor foolish. While focusing on the prime minister's personality, he also shows that Chamberlain's views were shared by many other leading politicians and diplomats. Mr. Charmley thus resurrects a whole school of thought on foreign policy which was forgotten in the wake of Churchill's triumph. Unlike Churchill, Chamberlain was not prepared to gamble an empire; but events produced, according to Mr. Charmley, indeed a “human tragedy.” Early British reviews of the book have called it “important,” “entertaining and absorbing,” “concise and spirited,” and “provocative.” The Guardian wrote: “Chamberlain hardly emerges a hero from these pages, but at least there is no excuse left for regarding him as no more than a wimp in a wing-collar.”

An engaging range of period texts and theme books for AS and A Level history. This book examines the key roles played by Adolf Hitler and Neville Chamberlain in the events that led to the outbreak of the Second World War. It looks at Hitler's foreign-policy aims, why appeasement became British foreign policy and, most extensively, the role of Chamberlain and appeasement in the unfolding international crisis of the late 1930s. Using a wide range of primary sources, Frank McDonough offers a generally critical interpretation of Chamberlain and appeasement, and suggests that standing up to Hitler earlier may have prevented war. The book also features a detailed analysis of the historical debates surrounding the issue of appeasement.

Studienarbeit aus dem Jahr 2003 im Fachbereich Geschichte Europa - Deutschland - Nationalsozialismus, II. Weltkrieg, Note: 1,0, Universität Rostock (Historisches Institut), Veranstaltung: Einführung in das Studium der Geschichtswissenschaften, 27 Quellen im Literaturverzeichnis, Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: Die Münchener Konferenz von 1938, der Gipfelpunkt des britischen Appeasement gegenüber dem nationalsozialistischen Deutschland, gilt bis heute als Fanal für das Zurückweichen der Demokratie vor der Diktatur. Auch siebzig Jahre nach der Unterzeichnung des Abkommens über die Abtretung der sogenannten Sudetengebiete der Tschechoslowakei an das Deutsche Reich reißen die Diskussionen über die Hintergründe und Folgen, über den Erfolg und Misserfolg der wahrlich geschichtsträchtigen Nacht vom 29. zum 30. September 1938 nicht ab. Deshalb bietet die vorliegende Quellenanalyse des Münchener Abkommens neben der üblichen sachlichen Quellenkritik und einer zusammenfassenden Inhaltsangabe wesentliche Einblicke in den historischen Kontext der Vereinbarung zwischen Hitler, Chamberlain, Daladier und Mussolini.

Standing against conventional wisdom, historian James Levy reevaluates Britain's twin policies of appeasement and rearmament in the late 1930s. By carefully examining the political and economic environment of the times, Levy argues that Neville Chamberlain crafted an active, logical and morally defensible foreign policy designed to avoid and deter a potentially devastating war. Levy shows that through Chamberlain's experience as Chancellor of the Exchequer, he knew that Britain had not yet fully recovered from the first World War and the longer an international confrontation could be avoided, the better Britain's chances of weathering the storm. In the end, Hitler could be neither appeased nor deterred, and recognizing this, Britain and France went into war better

armed and better prepared to fight.

A brilliant reappraisal of one of the most charismatic and powerful politicians of the twentieth century, which by examining Churchill's career in the years leading up to the Second World War posits the notion that, had he only been in power earlier, that war could conceivably have been prevented.'Exemplary . It confirms him as the outstanding authority on British foreign policy in the Thirties.' Kenneth O. Morgan, Independent'A characteristically scrupulous study of Churchill's role in the events that led to the outbreak of war in 1939, with a playfulness in literary exposition to offset its careful judgements and deep scholarship.' The Sunday Times'A balanced, enjoyable, highly readable account of the tumultuous 1930s' Robert Harris, Literary Review'One of the best expositions of Churchill's anti-appeasement stance yet written' Andrew Roberts, Mail on Sunday

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